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INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, many foreign markets have
remained closed to U.S. telecommunications
("telecom") and television providers. Where U.S.
companies have made inroads, market entry has
been limited to cellular telephone and cable television services for which U.S. companies have pioneered technology and deployment.' Upon entering into the Agreement on Basic Telecom
("WTO Agreement") on February 15, 1997, sixtynine member nations of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") made specific commitments to
provide market access to and national treatment
of basic telecom services. Now that the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") has
adopted new rules implementing the WTO Agreement, which became effective on January 1, many
U.S. communications technology concerns have
set wagons east and west, poised to enter previously closed markets. However, the WTO Agreement does not open numerous foreign markets.
Instead, it provides inadequate access to many
covered markets, and will expose U.S. companies
to increased foreign competition in domestic
markets. What does implementation of the WTO
Agreement mean to telecom service providers in
the U.S. and what foreign markets remain -largely
closed to international competition?
Background of the Breakthrough
Negotiations for the WTO Agreement commenced in April 1994 under the auspices of the
* Mr. Hoegle is a partner in Carter, Ledyard & Milburn
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I See Future of InternationalTelecommunications Trade Issues:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Hazardous

Negotiating Group on Basic Telecom ("NGBT").
The NGBT had been formed following the signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and formation of the WTO at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations.
The purpose of the NGBT was to open markets
and establish national pro-competitive regulatory
principles for the provision of basic telecom services among member nations.
The WTO Agreement secures these trade
precepts only for 'basic telecom' services, a subset
of telecom services which includes regulated voice
and other services that can be supplied using analog or digital technologies. 2 Increasingly important value-added services, a subset of services rely3
ing on digital technology to manipulate data
(e.g., e-mail, on-line data processing and database
retrieval), are outside the scope of the WTO
Agreement. As new outgrowths from the increasingly sophisticated use of computers in telecom
technology, value-added services had not been
subject to domestic monopoly control within
member nations and were not included in the negotiations.
As of 1996, international services, both basic
and value-added, accounted for approximately 15
percent of all telecom traffic, 4 while domestic local and long-distance telecom traffic within national borders continues to comprise the vast majority of all telecom services. Prior to the WTO
Agreement, only a handful of the world's markets
(i.e., Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States), were open to reth

Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 10 4
Cong., 3 (1996) [hereinafter Future of Int'l Telecomms.] (testimony of Congressman EdwardJ. Markey).
2
See Future of Int'l Telecomms., supra note 1, at 12 (testimony of Jeffrey Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
*
See id.
*
See id.
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sale or facilities-based competition in international services. 5 International trade in telecom
services has been constrained by dominant carriers and above-cost accounting rates. Such highly
inflated accounting rates are most often imposed
on a market entrant by a domestic monopolist
(and obligatory joint-venturer) as the 'price' for
accessing a domestic network. Consequently,
market entry for basic service providers had been
limited to strategic investments in privatized former monopoly companies or for wireless or cellular service, which were unattractive alternatives
for many potential entrants, particularly when
coupled with the high costs of access to the foreign telco's infrastructure. As one might imagine,
profit margins for domestic monopolies in a "cozy
cartel" have been staggering 6 and in many cases
serve as the source of development financing for
fledgling domestic networks.
Country Commitments Control
Under the WTO Agreement, sixty-nine countries, which comprise roughly 95 percent of the
global market for basic telecom services, 7 have
agreed to permit competition from foreign suppliers of basic telecom services. Sixty-five of the
signatory countries also have committed to enforce fair rules of competition for basic telecom
services which cover interconnection of competing telecom services suppliers, safeguards for
competition, and transparent and independent
regulation of telecom services.However, the commitments to these general
principles of fair access and competition by foreign telecom providers vary widely among the signatories to the WTO Agreement. Although sixtyone countries commit to competitive supply of
voice telephone services, two signatories (Brazil
and Switzerland) limit competitive opportunities
5

See Alan Cane, Global Sell-off Gathers Pace,

TIMES,

6

THE

FIN.

Sept. 19, 1996, at 1.

See Future of Int'l Telecomms., supra note 1, at 17 (testi-

mony of Reed E. Hundt, then Chairman, Federal Communications Comm'n).
7 See In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participationin the
U.S. Telecommunications Market, Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 7847, para. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Notice on Foreign Participation].

See id. para. 2.
9 See The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications: Informal Summary of Commitments and M.fn. Exemptions, Annex
I-Overview of Results of WFO Basic Telecommunications Negotia8

to voice services only over closed user groups. 9

Only about 40 percent of these sixty-one commitments specify a phased-in implementation of competitive access for domestic long-distance, local
and international services.1 0 Competition in resale of public voice telephone is included in fortytwo of the country commitments. 1 Further, of
the fifty-five commitment schedules to the WTO
Agreement (the European Union schedule accounts for fifteen government commitments),
only eleven schedules commit to full, non-phasedin competitive access to the domestic market for
local, domestic long-distance, international and
12
resale of public voice services.
Among the most liberal competitive access
commitments, the fifteen member-states of the
European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Japan and the U.S., all have agreed to immediate competitive access commitments to local,
domestic long-distance, international and resale
services concurrent with the January 1, 1998 entryinto-force of the Agreement.13 Nonetheless,
there are several member-specific restrictions
within the European Union commitment, including caps on investment from non-European
Union nations in Portuguese and Finnish telecom
concerns.' 4 Even these more liberal commitments do not contain direct references to accounting and settlement rate reform, but monopolist carriers that continue to rely on anticompetitive bilateral traffic routing and extremely
high margins on international traffic will face severe competitive pressures as market entry restrictions are eased.'

5

In contrast, other countries have maintained
existing limits on foreign ownership/access to
telecom facilities. Citing fear that its telecom market would be overrun by foreign competition,
Canada, for example, refused to increase its 46.7
percent limit on foreign ownership of its national
tions (Mar. 6, 1997) [hereinafter WrO Informal Summary, Annex I].
11

See id.
See id.

12

See id.

13

See id.
LAw &

10

14

PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

137-143, Booklet 12D (Joseph F. Dennin ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1997), European Communities and Their Member States Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/
31/Suppl.3.
15
See Notice on Foreign Participation,supra note 7, para. 7,
at 1130.
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telephone companies, despite an increase in the
U.S. limit effectively from 25 percent to 100 percent. 16 However, Canada recently has harmonized its foreign ownership and control caps for
broadcast and telecom entities. Whereas different
caps existed for foreign ownership or control of
either type of entity, the present attributable cap
of 46.7 percent1 7 is now in force across the board.
Canada's telecom authority, the Canadian RadioTelevision and Telecommunications Commission
("CRTC"), exercises broad statutory discretion in
determining actual control of a telecom or broadcast licensee. Consequently, the CRTC examines
the "personal, financial, contractual and business
relationships between the parties, as well as any
other relevant considerations""' in examining the
control issue for a given licensed entity or license
applicant. This broad authority flows from the
CRTC's mandate that it not license a corporation
that is effectively controlled by foreigners. 19
Hungary's commitment provides another example of the varied ownership limitations in some
commitments. Hungary precludes foreign investment in domestic telecom concerns without at
least a 25 percent Hungarian interest and one director vote retained for the Hungarian monopoly
provider MATAV. 20 The commitment also contains restrictions which will stall competitive access for international long-distance and domestic
services until December 31, 2002, and local calls
until December 31, 2003.21

Additionally, Hun-

ing of only up to 30 percent in domestic Malaysian operators that provide, inter alia,voice telephony, data transmission, domestic and
international satellite services and either satellite
23
links/capacity or satellite earth stations.
The Devil in the Details
In addition to the significant differences among
basic commitments, the WTO Agreement will be
subject to implementation by the national legislatures of WTO member nations. Only under rare
circumstances have such treaties been self-effectuating (given automatic force-and-effect in domestic law) and then only with regard to minor, noncontentious issues. In spite of the WTO Agreement's fundamental purpose of enabling uniform
competitive access for the supply of basic telecom
services among WTO nations, varying methods of
regulatory implementation and the wide variety of
country-specific limitations within country commitments may lead to a quagmire of varying access requirements and limitations for a telecom
services provider seeking entry into multiple national markets.
The FCC's initial efforts to implement the U.S.
commitment illustrate the kind of detailed process and rules that will accompany numerous
country commitments. Authorization of a foreign
carrier to provide telecom services in the U.S. is
subject to two statutory tests under Sections 214

gary explicitly prohibits any type of 'bypass' arrangement 22 (a method of routing calls in order
to benefit from lower accounting rates).
Similarly, although the Malaysian commitment
proposes access to a larger plate of telecom services than those generally to be covered by the
WTO Agreement, it allows for foreign sharehold-

and 310(b) of the Communications Act. 24 Sec-

16
See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex lb, Canada, Schedule of Specific Com-

19 See Direction to the CRTC (Eligible Canadian Corporations), C.R.C. ch. 376, §§ 2-4 (1996).
20
See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex lb, Hungary, Schedule of Specific
Commitments, Supplement 2, Apr. 11, 1997, WTO AGREE-

mitments, Supplement 3, Apr. 11, 1997, WTO AGREEMENT ON

BASIc

TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

GATS/SC/16/Suppl.3 [herein-

after Canada, Schedule of Specific Commitments]. Even though
Canada's foreign telecom ownership and control percentages are comparable to percentages used in the U.S, Canada's combined direct/parent ownership cap of 46.7 percent
proved to be a contentious issue during the NGBT negotiations. See Mike Mills & Paul Blustein, Nations Near Accord on
Telecommunications, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at B1.
17
See Canada, Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note
16.
18 Terence C.Y. Hui, (Vancouver, British Columbia), Decision, CRTC 96-224 (June 13, 1996).

tion 214 governs access to the U.S. market, and
Section 310(b) controls the licensing of a foreign
owned broadcaster or carrier.
In order to ensure competitive access to the
home markets of Section 214 applicants, the FCC
adopted the Effective Competitive Opportunities

MENT

ON

BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

GATS/SC/40/

Suppl.2.
21

See id.

See id.
See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 14,
1994, Specific Commitments, Malaysia, Schedule d, Apr. 11,
1997, WTO AGREEMENT ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
GATS/SC/52/Suppl.2.
24
See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310(b) (1994).
22

23
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("ECO") test in November 1995. The ECO test
utilizes six competitive access criteria to assess
whether the home market of a potential entrant
into the U.S. telecom market has reached competitive access parity with the U.S. 2 5 Under the ECO

test, a foreign carrier can only receive a license for
providing telecom services in the U.S. if U.S. carriers enjoy "effective competitive opportunities" in
those markets where the foreign carrier is dominant. The ECO test was first used in approving
Global One (a strategic alliance among Sprint,
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom), to determine whether the French and German telecom
markets did or would grant competitive access to
2
other U.S. carriers. "
In November 1997, the FCC drastically revised
its rules to implement the U.S. WTO market access commitment and open the U.S. telecom market to WTO Members. Applicants from WTO
Members no longer need to satisfy the ECO test
for: (1) Section 214 authority to provide international facilities-based service, resold switched services and resold non-interconnected private line
services; (2) cable landing licenses; and (3) authorizations to exceed the 25 percent foreign ownership benchmark in Section 310(b)(4) of the
Act. 27 The FCC also eliminated its equivalency

analysis for carriers seeking to provide switched
services over private lines between the U.S. and
25
See In re Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign Affiliated Entities, Report & Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3889, para. 40
(1995) (Commissioners Barrett and Ness issuing separate
statements). The six competitive access criteria include:
(1) ability of U.S. carriers to offer in the foreign country
international facilities-based services substantially similar
to those that the foreign carrier seeks to offer in the
United States; (2) existence of competitive safeguards in
the foreign country to protect against anti-competitive
and discriminatory practices, including cost-allocation
rules to prevent cross-subsidization; (3) availability of
published nondiscriminatory charges, terms and conditions for interconnection to foreign domestic carriers'
facilities for termination and origination of international
services; (4) timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of
technical information needed to use or interconnect
with carriers' facilities; (5) protection of carrier and customer proprietary information; and (6) existence of an
independent regulatory body with fair and transparent
procedures to enforce competitive safeguards.

Id.
26
See generally In re Matter of Sprint Corp., Petitionfor Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310(b)(4) and (d) and the Public
Interest Requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, as

amended, 11 FCC Rcd. 1850 (1996).
27
See In re Matter of Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, LB Docket
No. 97-142, FCC 97-398 (rel. Nov. 26, 1997), at para. 29
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WTO Members. 28 However, the FCC retained the
rigorous ECO test for non-WTO Member applicants. 29

In proposing to open the U.S. telecommunications market, the FCC had noted that some WTO
Members "have made no [competitive access]
commitments, have committed to less than full
market access, have not committed to enforcing
fair rules of competition or might not implement
their commitments fully."3 0 Nonetheless, the FCC
concluded that it was not "necessary or appropriate""' to examine each WTO Member's marketopening commitments or the extent to which it
had implemented such commitments when evaluating the propriety of foreign carrier entry into
the U.S. market. Instead, the FCC determined
that the commitments of the WTO Members, coupled with the FCC's revised dominant carrier safeguards, "No Special Concessions" rule and separate affiliate requirements, 3 2 settlement rate
benchmarks conditions and continuing major
changes in technology and traffic routing, are sufficient to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the
U.S. international services market. 33 Further, the
FCC anticipates additional international competitive pressure on WTO Members to follow through
with their open-market commitments and will rely
on the U.S. Trade Representative to monitor
WTO Member compliance and to pursue consul[hereinafter Foreign ParticipationOrder].
"4- See id., para. 76.
29) See id., para. 124.
10 Notice on Foreign Participation,supra note 7, para. 14.
31
Foreign ParticipationOrder, supra note 27, para. 29. The

FCC noted that Article II of the CATS requires WTO Members to accord "service and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to
like services and service suppliers of any other country." Id.
para 40. Consequently, the FCC feared that limiting access
to the United States market based on the "existence or quality" of a WTO Member's commitment could be viewed as a
violation of Article II. See id.
32
The FCC's No Special Concessions rule generally prohibits all U.S. international carriers from agreeing to accept
special concessions from any foreign carrier or administration. See id., para. 17 n.20. The FCC has limited application

of the rule by adopting a rebuttable presumption permitting
U.S. carriers to accept special concessions granted by foreign
carriers which possess less than a fifty percent market share
in each relevant foreign market without obtaining FCC approval. See id., para. 161. The FCC also specified the kinds of
exclusive dealings with foreign carriers with market power in
services, facilities or functions on the foreign end of a U.S.
international route required for the provision of basic
telecom services that are covered by the No Special Concessions rule. See id., para. 165.
33

See id., paras. 33-34.

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP CAPS AND THE WTO AGREEMENT

19981

tation and dispute settlement in the event of non3 4

compliance.

. In view of its own safeguards and increasing
international competition, the FCC found it highly
unlikely that a Section 214 applicant for international facilities-based service from a WTO Member would pose a risk to competition in the U.S.
market. It identified the following extreme circumstances and applicant conduct which might
justify denial of a Section 214 application from a
WTO Member applicant:
" the ability, upon entry or shortly thereafter, to raise
the price of U.S. international service by restricting
its output (particularly a carrier that is affiliated with
multiple foreign carriers that control bottleneck facilities);
" involvement in adjudicated violations of U.S. antitrust law or other laws protecting competition;
" history of anti-competitive or fraudulent behavior in
a foreign market;
" past fraudulent representations to U.S. governmental units; and
* involvement in criminal misconduct involving false
35
statements or dishonesty.

The FCC also may deny an application where issues of national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade concerns are raised by the

Members in excess of the twenty-five percent foreign ownership benchmark through a streamlined application process. 38 Previously, the "pub-

lic interest" analysis required for FCC approval of
foreign ownership of a holding company for a
common carrier licensee had involved an arduous
application process.3

9

Although Executive

Branch agencies may oppose applications because
of concerns of national interest as noted above
during the streamlined application process, the
FCC cautioned that other opponents will have to
overcome a "strong presumption" in favor of
granting such applications.

40

In the Running: Satellite Earth Stations and
Non-U.S. Satellite Systems
Foreign ownership also raises issues for satellite
uplink/downlink licenses. The FCC has determined that the ownership restrictions of Section
310(b) and Section 100.11 (e) of the Rules 4' apply
only if the earth station licensee is a broadcaster
or a common carrier. 42 The FCC has clarified

In addition to eliminating the ECO test from
the "public interest" standard of Section

that operators of subscription television services,
including DBS and DARS, are neither broadcasters nor common carriers43 and specifically noted
that Section 310(b)(4) would not apply to DBS

310(b) (4) of the Act,3 7 the FCC determined to al-

and DARS. 44

low presumptively indirect investment from WTO

Communications Act states that a "station license

36
Executive Branch.

34
35
36
37
38

See id., para. 39.
See id., paras. 52-53.

See id., paras 61-62.
See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (4).
See Foreign ParticipationOrder, supra note 27, paras. 322-

29.
39 Presumably, the method for measuring the level of
foreign ownership and control will remain unchanged. The
FCC has devised a method of "ownership attribution" which
is determined "by successive multiplication of the ownership
percentages for each link in the vertical ownership
chain. . .except that wherever the ownership percentage in
the chain exceeds 50 percent, [it is not] included in the multiplication." See 47 C.F.R. § 63.18, Note 4 to para. (h). For
example, if A owns 30 percent of company X, which owns 60
percent of company Y, which owns 26 percent of "the carrier," then X's interest in the carrier would be 26 percent,
the same as Y's (as X's interest in Y exceeds 50 percent). Id.
In this case, if either X orY is a foreign entity with investment
in a U.S. telecom concern, each of their ownership percentages would exceed the 25 percent threshold presently set by
Section 310(b) (4).
40
Foreign ParticipationOrder, supra note 27, paras. 112-13.
The FCC's analysis and approval of applications to enable the
merger of MCI Communications Corporation and British
Telecommunications plc while finalizing its open access rules
suggest that the competitive impact of foreign ownership and

However, Section 310(a) of the

consolidation will remain significant in the FCC's analysis,
particularly where "one of the merging parties is or was the
incumbent monopoly provider." See In re Merger of MCI
Communications Corp. and British Telecommunications plc,
GN Docket No. 96-245, FCC 97-302 (rel. Sept. 24, 1997) para.
5 [hereinafter MCI Order]. Of course, MCI subsequently
agreed to merge with WorldCom, Inc. SeeJohnJ. Keller and
Steven Lipin, "WorldCom, MCI Deal Could Rewrite Script for a
New Phone Era,"WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1997, at Al.
41
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1994); 47 C.F.R.
§ 100.11(e) (1996).
42
See, e.g., In re Licensing Under Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, of Non-common Carrier
Transmit/Receive Earth Stations for Operation with INTELSAT Global Communications Satellite System, Declaratory Ruling, 8 FCC Rcd. 1387, at 1390, para. 20 (1993) (stating that
foreign-owned applicant would be ineligible for earth station
license under alien ownership restrictions if found to be a
broadcaster or common carrier).
43 See id. para. 21 n.28, citing In re Subscription Video, 2
FCC Rcd. 1001 (Feb. 17, 1987), affd sub nom., National Ass'n
for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1988); see also In re MCI Telecommunications Corp., in 73SAT-P/L-96, DA96-1793, para. 21 (Dec. 6, 1996) [hereinafter
MCI].
44 See MCI, supra note 43, para. 21 & n.40. Although section 310(b) (4) does not apply to DBS and DARS, it expressly
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required under this chapter shall not be granted
to or held by any foreign government or the representative thereof, ' 45 and the FCC has concluded

that this restriction applies to DBS and DARS.
The FCC has determined that Section 310(a)
does not prohibit all ownership by foreign government entities, but only defacto or de jure control of

the license by a foreign government or its repre46
sentative.
Notwithstanding the rapidly changing regulatory landscape, "a license is still required to use a
receive-only earth station to receive a non-U.S.
originated signal, or any signal transmitted over a
non-U.S. satellite." 47 Consequently, the FCC will

regulate access to the U.S. by non-U.S. satellites
through the earth station licensing process, 48 because the earth station license provides "the only
regulatory point available to the Commission."

49

The FCC will require non-U.S. satellite operators
to apply to serve the U.S. either through: (a) participation in a U.S. space station processing
round, or (b) the earth station licensing process. 5 0 However, the FCC will not require a non-

ments, and national security, law enforcement,
trade and foreign policy concerns. 53 Nonetheless,
entry by WATO Member satellite systems will be
presumed to promote competition in the United
States satellite services so that parties opposing a
grant of authority will have a heavy burden to
show competitive harm. 54 Thus, the foreign ownership restrictions on the uplink/downlink of
telecom and data transmission common carrier
services have been transformed dramatically for
WTO Member applicants.
Regardless of the level of foreign ownership in
the proposed licensee, the FCC has proposed to
apply an ECO-sat analysis in evaluating applications for earth station licenses that involve oneway satellite television and radio services, including DTH-FSS, DBS and DARS, 55 using a foreign-

licensed satellite and for access to satellites li56
censed by non-WTO Members for all services.
The FCC has retained the ECO-Sat analysis for
such earth station licenses because "of the continuing need to encourage open markets for these
services and to avoid anticompetitive conduct in
'57

Other executive branch de-

U.S. satellite system to obtain a Title III license for
5
its space station. '
Again, in implementing the U.S. WTO commitments, the FCC has opened the U.S. satellite market by waiving the ECO-Sat test for applicants
seeking to access satellite systems licensed by
WTO Members to provide satellite services covered by the U.S. commitments. 52 In evaluating
WTO Member applications, the FCC will determine whether grant of the requested authority is
consistent with the public interest, convenience
and necessity, considering factors such as the effect on competition in the United States, spectrum availability, eligibility and operating require-

the U.S. market.

applies to common carrier, broadcast, aeronautical en route,

Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United
States, FurtherNotice ofProposed Rulemaking, FCC 97-252, paras.
20, 56 (July 18, 1997) [hereinafter FurtherNotice on DISCO I1].
50 See id. paras. 48-49.
51
See Satellite Entry Order, supra note 48, para. 188.
See id., paras. 39-40.
52
53 See id., paras. 41, 149-50, 154-59, 166-67, 173-74, 17879.
54 See id., para. 41.
55 Direct-to-home Fixed Satellite Service, Digital Broadcast Service, and Digital Audio Radio Service, respectively.
See Further Notice on Disco II, supra note 49, para. 20.
See id. para. 98.
56
57
See id.
See MCI Order, supra note 40, para. 281.
58
59 Satellite Entry Order, supra note 48, para. 204.

or aeronautical fixed radio station licenses. See id.
45 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1994).
46
See, e.g., In re STARSYS Global Positioning, Inc., Request
for a Declaratory Ruling ConcerningSection 310 of the Communications Act, 10 FCC Rcd. 9392, para. 9, at 9393 (1995); see also 47
U.S.C. § 310(a) (1994).
47
Televisa International, LLC, DA97-1758 (rel. Aug. 18,
1997), para. 6; see also 47 C.F.R. § 25.131(j) (1996).
See In re Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory
48
Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide
Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United
States, Report and Order, IB Docket No. 96-111, FCC 97-399
(rel. Nov. 26, 1997), at paras. 183-188 [hereinafter Satellite Entry Order].
49 In re Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S.-Licensed Space Stations to Provide

partments have urged the FCC to "consider foreign ownership restrictions and public interest
criteria for subscription DBS services in a
rulemaking proceeding prior to reaching any
such determination in an adjudicatory proceeding, "and the FCC has indicated that it may initiate a rulemaking."

58

In order to minimize the burden of such applications, the FCC will permit applicants to request
"blanket" licenses covering thousands of technically identical receive-only antennas such as home
satellite dishes. 59 The space station operator, service supplier, equipment manufacturer, or even
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an electronics retailer may file such blanket applications. 60 If the FCC previously has granted a particular foreign satellite access to the United States
to provide DTH/DBS services, it will permit the
applicant for a blanket earth station license to include an exhibit citing the prior grant of access
and confirming its intention to provide the same
previously authorized services. 6 1 Prior FCC decisions granting a blanket license to Televisa International, LLC and dismissing without prejudice
the application of Telquest Ventures, L.L.C., suggest that the regulatory treatment of DTH providers in the foreign applicant's country will be critical to the Commission's review of an application
62
and grant of authority.

Broadcast: The Final Frontier
Market access issues for broadcast and radio
were not included in the most recent round of
GATT negotiations on trade in services, and few
WTO Members have independently addressed
competition in these media. In the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act"), Congress relaxed the U.S. national limits on ownership of television stations and eliminated national limits on
radio station ownership. 63

Specifically, section

202(a) of the 1996 Act eliminated any provisions
which would limit the number of AM or FM
broadcast stations which may be owned by one entity. 64 Section 202(c) of the Act eliminated re-

strictions on the number of television stations
owned nationally, but it retained an increased national audience reach limitation of 35 percent. 65
Several FCC rulemaking proceedings are underway to revise ownership rules, most notably the
method for determining ownership attribution,
which are expected to tighten the ownership
60
61

See id.

See id.

62
Canadian restrictions requiring "a minimum amount
of Canadian content" and "restrictions over the use of nonCanadian satellites for distribution of telephony and broadcasting services" were central to the FCC's dismissal of Telquest's applications. In granting the Televisa application, the
FCC noted the reciprocal "Protocol Concerning Transmission and Reception of Signals from Satellites for Provision of
Direct-to-Home Satellite Services in the United States
America and the United Mexican States." Compare Telquest
Ventures, LLC, DA 96-1128 (rel. July 15, 1996), at para. 7;
Televisa International, LLC, DA 97-1758 (rel. Aug. 18, 1997),
at para. 2.

rules.6 6 However, Congress took no action on the
foreign ownership restrictions. Thus, foreign investment in a U.S. broadcasting entity will continue to be governed by the same licensing and
ownership restrictions under section 310(b).
CONCLUSION
Although the WTO Agreement will enable increased access to national telecom markets, how
far and how fast a foreign competitor can enter a
target market will largely be determined by that
country's commitment schedule and legislative or
regulatory action bringing the WTO Agreement
into force-and-effect. As national regulators issue
implementing rules similar to those adopted by
the FCC, telecom carriers should take notice.
The final test for whether competitive access has
been truly granted to a given market will depend
upon this implementation process. As the FCC
has recognized, "there is considerable uncertainty
concerning how quickly and to what extent regulatory and market conditions in various telecom67
munications markets will change.
Further liberalization of broadcast and satellite
access and ownership rules will likely follow. The
FCC's recent report order implementing WTO
'Agreement-like' foreign access requirements for
the provision of services via satellite will not be the
final word. Rather, it is an interim step in putting
all communications services under the auspices of
a liberalized global trade pact. With the next
round of negotiations on trade in services slated
to begin no later than January 1, 2000, 1 full MFN
agreements on improved market access commitments and national treatment including broadcasting and satellite systems may not be far off.

63 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, § 202(a), 110 Stat. 56, 110.
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